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The Media and Propaganda in Iraq From 2003 Onwards - Assignment Example

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The purpose of this assignment is to investigate the depiction of the American actions in Iraq in media along with its social impact. The writer of the assignment "The Media and Propaganda in Iraq From 2003 Onwards" claims that winning the media war is a major part of winning military combats.
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THE MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ FROM 2003 ONWARD Wars do not rage on battlefields alone. They are fought ideologically, politically, economically and even in the broad, amorphous realm of “information.” The greater war is fought as much in the media (through which information is distributed to people) as it is on the field. Few wars have better proven the truth behind these statements than the Iraq War, which has been raging since 2003. Indeed, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in 2006 that more than half the battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. The war has done two things for the American military in terms of information operations (IO): the first is show them how weak their original IO was, and second, given them many opportunities to improve it. This article by Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, et al, talks about both and provides much food for thought. Metz and his fellow officers have been on the frontlines of American actions in Iraq and are profoundly familiar with information operations. There views are formed out of deep experience and should be take seriously. One of the main concepts they talk about his how much IO should be integrated into military operations generally speaking. This is called bridging the firewall. Firewalls are strict self-imposed limits on what organizations can or cannot do. While they might be protective—keeping enemies at bay—they also prevent friends from getting too close which can be a problem. They argue through the course of their article that it is important to be on the winning side of the media war because of the tremendous effect it has for the purpose of understanding counter insurgency tactics and for communicating to the local population without filters. Much of the American mission in Iraq has been about winning hearts and minds: without these, Iraq will simply be a boiling cauldron of resentment and rage. It is important not only for the U.S. military to beam out a positive message about themselves, it is also important the military to listen to what people are saying (Second Front, 12). That too is part of the information war. However, these basic principles have not always been applied effectively by the American military during its long mission in the country of Iraq as Lt.-Gen. Metz makes clear. The key to future success is coming up with a model that maintains the independence and authenticity of different elements of military operations while simultaneously having an overarching information rubric for various missions (Col. Ralph O. Baker). It is encouraging that there is an awareness about the lack of strategy in information operations at the highest levels of the United States military (Adam Brookes). There appears to be an emerging recognition among modern warriors that a broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic approach to information operations is necessary—an approach that recognizes the challenges of the global information environment and seamlessly integrates the functions of traditional information operations and public affairs. Furthermore, a clear need exists for strategic and operational commanders to become as aggressive and as offensive-minded with information operations as they have always been with other elements of combat power and war-fighting functions—for example, movement and maneuver, fire support, intelligence, and so on (Massing Effects in the Information Domain). This is an important aspect of Metz’s argument; while some older generation officer may disapprove and not care much about information and its uses, they are being proven wrong on the battlefield. It is important to not that integrating operations with an information strategy does not exclusively mean within the American military. An additional complication is bringing native security forces into the information fold (Robert M. Cassidy). While fighting insurgents, the occupying forces generally have to prepare native security forces to carry on the fighting when the occupying forces prepare to leave. One way of winning the native forces over is for the occupying forces to reward native personnel for their contributions to the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the area (“Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism”). Another key factor, Metz writes, is involving the native security forces in the information operations and teaching them how to utilize such operations effectively. If there is a big division in information between forces distrust will grow (Information Operations, 12). He describes an important part of the battle of Fallujah where Iraqi commandos took control of a hospital—their operations greatly assisted by communication technologies and better situational awareness. Another key lesson was how the Americans taught the Iraqi forces how important it was to disrupt insurgents own propaganda abilities: During the military decision-making process, MNF-W identified a piece of key IO terrain that it believed had to be secured early in the operation to begin eliminating the enemys ability to disseminate misinformation and propaganda. The Fallujah hospital had long been used as a propaganda organ by insurgent forces and had been one of the most significant sources of enemy information during Operation Vigilant Resolve. By securing this key IO terrain, MNF-W could significantly disrupt the enemys access point to disseminate information. It is important to recognize that information operations should be expanded to be inclusive of the native security forces and the reins should be shared with other commanders. One of the key concepts in Metz’ article is the concept that there is a firewall between IO things like Psyops and the Public Affairs aspect of the military. There is a thin line between total propaganda and the truth. If the military loses sight of which is which—if they start believing their own hype—serious problems will ensue (“Information Operations `Blowback.”). This can be seen in the operation of the Iraqi insurgents. The insurgents are powerful because their ideologies are inextricably linked to the Islamic faith. But so much of their energy and passion is motivated by lies told about Americans; many insurgents have, for example, been brainwashed by Al Qaeda propaganda. They no longer know truth from falsehood and so have taken to blowing up their fellow citizens. The American military must be more clear-sighted. Metz writes: This firewall is essential to ensuring PSYOP, Deception Operations, EW, and CNO do not migrate into PA and discredit the PA effort. We need to be proud of our values and be prepared to underwrite the risk that we will expose too much in the service of transparency; this is counterbalanced with an implicit trust that our values and the truth will eventually prevail. Truth and transparency are strengths and not hindrances. That said, by necessity these firewalls will have to be bridged to allow greater operational success. It is a very delicate balance. In the battle of Falluja, the army packaged information and sent it to the real media for distribution. The information was advantageous the to the military, begging the question “Was this an act of IO or of Public Affairs?” Metz believes that asking the question is important, and keeping vigilant against creeping towards total IO in all regards, but nonetheless success speaks much louder in such debates. Americans have natural advantages with respect to information operations. The role of the media is limited in the Arab world (Second Front, 122). Therefore the amount of information technology that is available to the average soldier of the United States army is not available to the insurgent. Even in the case of the US soldier, he does not fully avail himself of the information technology available to him. However, the US soldier is superior to the insurgent in the information domain because of his exposure to this technology available to him. Over the six years that serious IOs have been in use they have produced effective results in the war not only with the Iraqi insurgents, but with global terrorism (Information Operations, 12). Nonetheless, in order for information operations to be successful it is necessary stay active and on the offensive. Metz argues it is necessary to employ information operations aggressively so that the war is won not only on the conventional battlefield but also in the media. While on the subject, it is also pertinent to note that some (not all) insurgents are media savvy and learning at a speed perhaps faster than the American military. They also have the advantage of being closer to the ground and having an easier time moulding the opinion of the locals by highlighting the excesses of the occupying forces. The “excesses” can mean anything from losing a few men to enduring airborne strafing. As stated earlier, there are no firewalls when it comes to insurgents: everything they believe is combined; there are no separations. In order for the allies to use information operations effectively, they have to use it strategically and aggressively. This may not eliminate the insurgents, but it will keep them on tenterhooks and it may cause them to resort to foolhardy activities that will hardly gain them any public sympathy (Massing Effects in the Information Domain). It can only be hoped that the new American administration under Barack Obama, will continue to bridge the firewalls carefully in the increasingly significant actions taking place in Afghanistan. It is important to remember that America is still learning how to do this effectively; but current successes bode well for the future of such information operations. The importance of information operations can be gauged from events in the war that have led to the US military suspending activities that are not integrated with the media. It is a significant truth: winning the media war is a major part of winning military combats. Few things can be as damaging as a favorable military expedition that has led to a media fiasco. In spite of its military dictum, information operation has the ability to follow through on military excursions because it offers transparency and accountability. It is also is a huge part of military success because of the way it supplements and augments actions by both winning over the local population and confusing or misleading the enemy. Sources: Col. Ralph O. Baker, The decisive weapon: A brigade combat team commanders perspective on information operations, AIR University Library, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/2007_137873/137832.html Dr Douglas E. Streusand and Lt. Col. Harry D. Tunnell IV, Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism, The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection. Library of Congress Country Studies, Iraq, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0005) Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations, http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/july_2006/7_06_2.html Robert M. Cassidy, The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/06summer/cassidy.pdf Dwayne Winseck. “Information Operations `Blowback.” International Communication Gazette, Vol. 70, No. 6, 419-441 (2008) Adam Brookes. “US plans to fight the net revealed.” BBC Online. January 27, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4655196.stm John R. MacArthur. Second Front. L.A.: University of California Press, 2004. Leigh Armistead. Information Operations. West Point: Brasseys, 2004. Read More
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